翻译资格考试高级口译练习题：中国经济
汉译英
2016年，在世界各大经济体经济增速放缓，各种风险暴露的情况下，中国国民生产总值增长7.8%，居民消费价格涨幅回落到2.6%。2012年全年粮食产量达到589570000吨，实现新中国成立以来第二次连续九年增长，连续六年粮食产量超过五亿吨。
中国经济数据，正中红心。增长率当真是年7%?
一切似乎完美得难以置信。中国政府今年年初制定了“约7%”的增长目标;像是一向为了回应共产党的需求，中国经济连续两个季度准确命中了7%的目标。这暗合了某些怀疑论调。
第一季度的确看着可疑。工业产值增长率降至金融危机后的最低点;房地产市场这一经济支柱也严重垮塌。中国发布的第一季度实际增长率(即考虑通货膨胀后的增长率)为同比增长7%，但名义增长率仅为5.8%。使得真实增长率达到更高水平的唯一途径是GDP平减指数(通货膨胀衡量指标)调整为-1.1%。
这意味着中国经济遭受了大范围通货紧缩，但离奇的是与此同时，消费价格增长大于1%。凯投宏观的刘畅和马克·威廉姆斯测算，如果GDP平减指数能更加精确，那么第一季度的实际增长率将会再低一至二个百分点。
The data for the second quarter are more credible. In nominal terms, growth rebounded strongly to 7.1%. The corollary is that the GDP deflator is now 0.1%, a reading that is much more consistent with rising consumer prices and falling producer prices.
第二季度的数据则更为可信。名义增长率强势反弹至7.1%。其必然结果是GDP平减指数现已达到0.1%，表现得与增长的消费价格和下跌的生产价格更为一致。
但篡改痕迹仍然存在：国家统计局将2014年第二季度的环比增长率从2%改为1.9%，且未对此做出任何解释。这种降低比较基数的行为无疑是对今年第二季度数据的美化。但这影响不大，大概只是零点几个百分点而已。
此外，二季度中国增长率的来源比一季度要来的更加明朗。投资虽持续放缓，服务业却加速上升。
二季度工业同比增长了5.9%，低于一季度的6.4%。与之相反，服务业的增长率从一季度的7.9%跃至8.9%。自从服务业占GDP比重大于工业之后，这就显得尤为重要。这种服务业的增长不太可能持续。
它在很大程度上来源于股市飙升时促进的金融机构的繁荣。但在股价骤降之后，近几周，原先的助力恐怕就成了累赘。然而这是暂时的，毕竟这一场金融盛况并不是中国的统计学家编造出来的。
金融体系运行稳健，银行业风险抵御能力持续增强，资本充足率从2007年底的8.4%提升到去年底的13.3%，不良贷款率由6.1%下降到0.95%。坚持搞好房地产市场调控不动摇，遏制了房价过快上涨势头。
参考译文
Despite the slowdown of economic growth in the world's major economies and the manifestation of various risks, China's GDP grew by 7.8 percent in 2012 and the rise in the CPI (Consumer Price Index) fell back to 2.6 percent. China's annual grain output in 2012 reached 589.57 million tons, registering the second nine-year consecutive growth since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, topping the 500-million-ton mark for six years in a row.
Finance and economics: China's economic data, Right on target. Is growth really 7% a year?
It all seems a little too perfect to be true. The Chinese government set a growth target of “about 7%” this year; the economy, ever responsive to the Communist Party's needs, has hit exactly that number for two quarters in a row. Cue a chorus of skepticism.
The first quarter did look suspicious. Growth in industrial production was the weakest since the depths of the financial crisis; the property market, a pillar of the economy, crumbled. China reported real growth (ie, after accounting for inflation) of 7% year on year in the first quarter, but nominal growth of just 5.8%. The only way to arrive at the higher real figure was to put the GDP deflator, a measure of inflation, at -1.1%.
That implied the economy suffered broad-based deflation, a bizarre claim given that consumer prices rose by more than 1% at the same time. Had the GDP deflator been more accurate, Chang Liu and Mark Williams of Capital Economics reckon, real growth in the first quarter would have been one or two percentage points lower.
There were signs of some tampering: without explanation, the national bureau of statistics cut the quarter-on-quarter growth rate in the second quarter of 2014 to 1.9% from 2%. That doubtless flattered the data for the second quarter of this year by lowering the base for comparison. But the impact is small: a few tenths of a percentage point, perhaps.
What is more, the sources of Chinese growth in the second quarter were less mysterious than in the first. Although investment continued to slow, services accelerated.
Industry grew by 5.9% year on year in the second quarter, down from 6.4% in the first quarter. In contrast, services jumped to 8.9% growth from 7.9% in the first quarter. That matters since services now account for a larger share of Chinese GDP than industry. This acceleration in services is unlikely to last.
It derives to a large extent from the soaring stock market, which boosted financial firms. That lift has presumably become a drag in recent weeks as share prices have dived. Transient as it was, however, China's statisticians did not invent the financial boom.
The financial system functioned soundly. The banking sector became better able to avert risks. Its capital adequacy rate increased from 8.4% at the end of 2007 to 13.3% by the end of last year, and its non-performing loans dropped from 6.1% to 0.95%. We kept a firm grip on the real estate market and kept housing prices from rising too quickly.
