2012年CATTI一级笔译英译汉真题
原文：
No one can lay claim to so much influence on the shaping of foreign policy over the past 50 years as Henry Kissinger. In and out of office, he has been intelligently ubiquitous. Almost two decades have passed since the publication of Diplomacy, a masterly study of the subject that will long endure as a bible for all who believe that nation states remain the principal building blocks in international politics, whatever the human aspirations towards international co-operation.
Now, with On China, Kissinger has turned his mind to a subject on which he has a unique vantage point. Publishers must have drooled at the prospect of this guru from the last century writing about the rising global power of the present one, especially given his own role in helping to open it up to the world.
For Henry Kissinger, ancient China was a subtle place. That in turn led to its special resonance in the present: “In no other country,” he writes, “is it conceivable that a modern leader would initiate a major national undertaking by invoking strategic principles from a millennium-old event,” as Mao often did in discussing policy matters. And Mao “could confidently expect his colleagues to understand the significance of his allusions.” How could it not be so? For “Chinese language, culture, and political institutions were the hallmarks of civilization, such that even regional rivals and foreign conquerors adopted them to varying degrees as a sign of their own legitimacy.” “Strategic acumen” shaped China’s earliest international policies; and to support its central position it could call on a remarkable series of potential followers and aides.
A good example was the Chinese scholar known in the West as Confucius, who taught by citing examples to a small group of loyal and dedicated students. They reciprocated by drawing on their conversations for practical examples that could create a legacy on his behalf—forming a canon that Kissinger describes as “something akin to China’s Bible and its Constitution combined.” Whereas in the Western world “balance-of-power diplomacy was less a choice than an inevitability,” and “no religion retained sufficient authority to sustain universality,” for China foreign contacts did not form “on the basis of equality.”
Kissinger’s reflections about the Western and Chinese concepts of strategy lead him to posit a stark distinction, one in which “the Chinese ideal stressed subtlety, indirection, and the patient accumulation of relative advantage,” while “the Western tradition prized the decisive clash of forces.” It is a good way for Kissinger to prepare the reader for a dualistic approach to two vast philosophical and military traditions, which he begins by summarizing the key differences between the Chinese players of the board game weiqi (the Japanese go) and those favoring the contrasting game of chess. While chess is about the clash of forces, about “decisive battle” and the goal of “total victory,” all of which depend on the full deployment of all the pieces of the board, weiqi is a game of relative gain, of long-range encirclement, which starts with an empty board and only ends when it “is filled by partially interlocking areas of strength.”
Teachers and practitioners of grand strategy have studied these contrasts between the two for many centuries. The principles of weiqi are echoed in the haunting text known as The Art of War, by a certain Master Sun, writing around the same time as Confucius. Kissinger quotes Sun at some length, drawing especially on his insights into the concepts of “indirect attack” and “psychological combat.”
译文：
过去50年间，在外交政策的形成方面影响最大者，莫过于亨利•基辛格(Henry Kissinger)。无论在朝还是在野，基辛格的身影无处不在，这当属明智。《大外交》(Diplomacy)一书出版至今，已近二十载。其中有一个观点：无论人类多么渴望国际合作，国家仍将是国际政治基石。在信奉这一观点的人心目中，基辛格这本研究外交的经典著作，堪称一部经久不衰的“圣经”。
如今，凭借《论中国》(On China)一书，基辛格将思想转向了另一个话题，在这个问题上，他有着独特的发言权。可以肯定，从上世纪起，出版商们就在巴望着这位大师能写一写这个当时已开始崛起、如今还在继续崛起的新兴大国，特别是考虑到基辛格的特殊身份——他帮助世界打开了中国的大门。
《论中国》一书的核心内容，讲述的是1972年美国总统理查德•尼克松(Richard Nixon)和基辛格(时任美国国家安全顾问)的中国之行，以及基辛格访问前所做的秘密准备。在书中，基辛格对中国历史进行了简单回顾，剖析了会见过的几位领导人的性格，并详细描述了会面时的细节。基辛格总结了近年来中国所取得的成就，就民主价值观(或曰普世价值)与外交实务之间的关系表达了一些总体看法，并毫不出人意料地表示：他对美国与这个世界第一人口大国合作的前景充满期待。
从很多方面来看，《论中国》是基辛格对其毕生追求的一些要务的辩解。尽管基辛格提到了美国对多元主义、民主和人权近乎宗教般的执着，但他同时辩称，这些合理关注不应妨碍对于国家利益的追求，而在40年的时间里，与中国恢复邦交一直符合美国的国家利益。此外，在谋求与中国恢复友好邦交的初始阶段，另一个额外好处(同时也的确是动机之一)就是：孤立苏联(Soviet Union)。近年来，在美国忙于处理各种国际事务之际，中国常常采取配合的姿态，比如在伊拉克战争之前，相对于美国一些讨厌的欧洲盟友，中国反而显得“更加合作”。
基辛格在书中写道：“评判政治家，要看他们能否长期坚持其理念。”当然，基辛格非常乐于提到一点：他很早就意识到一个繁荣、开放的中国对世界有利。可以理解，他认为对人权问题的过度关注不应干扰严肃的外交，或许事实证明这一看法是正确的，但最近中东的事态发展却倾向于得出相反的结论。关于民主，最终并不存在什么“阿拉伯例外”，或许也不存在什么“中国例外”，近来中国安全机构的所作所为，似乎也印证了这一点。
